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Abstract—Many types of brute-force attacks are known to
exhibit a characteristic ‘flat’ behavior at the network-level,
meaning that connections belonging to an attack feature a similar
number of packets and bytes, and duration. Flat traffic usually
results from repeating similar application-layer actions, such
as login attempts in a brute-force attack. For typical attacks,
hundreds of attempts span over multiple connections, with each
connection containing the same, small number of attempts. The
characteristic flat behavior is used by many Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSes), both for identifying the presence of attacks and
– once detected – for observing deviations, pointing out potential
compromises, for example. However, flatness of network traffic
may become indistinct when TCP retransmissions and control
information come into play. These TCP phenomena affect not
only intrusion detection, but also other forms of network traffic
analysis. The contribution of this work is twofold. First, we
analyze the impact of retransmissions and control information on
network traffic based on traffic measurements. To do so, we have
developed a flow exporter extension that was deployed in both a
campus and a backbone network. Second, we show that intrusion
detection results improve dramatically by up to 16 percentage
points once IDSes are able to ‘flatten’ network traffic again,
which we have validated by means of analyzing log files of almost
60 hosts over a period of one month.
I. INTRODUCTION
Flow monitoring has become the prevalent approach for
monitoring larger-scale, high-speed networks [1]. By aggre-
gating packets into flows, which are defined as sets of packets
that pass by an observation point in a network during a certain
time interval [2], flow monitoring is typically said to be more
scalable than monitoring approaches that rely on storing and
analyzing individual packets. The fact that many high-end
packet forwarding devices are already shipped with support
for flow export protocols like NetFlow [3] and IPFIX [2],
makes flow monitoring a cost-effective monitoring approach
at strategic observation points in the network. Flow export
can be applied to a variety of monitoring applications, such
as network security, Quality of Service (QoS) monitoring, and
accounting [4]. The scalability advantages of flow monitoring
also come at a cost, however. For example, it is widely
known that measurement artifacts may be present in flow data
that affect the accuracy of the data in a negative way [5].
Also, by design, all packets that belong to a particular flow
are accounted in the same way, making it impossible to
differentiate classes of packets within the same flow (e.g.,
retransmitted packets).
The problem of having every packet in a flow accounted in
the same way recently became apparent in our flow-based SSH
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) SSHCure [6].1 SSHCure
is able to identify network scans, brute-force attacks using
dictionaries (lists of frequently-used login credentials) and
most important, compromises, which may be the result of
a brute-force attack. Similar to other works in the area of
SSH dictionary attack detection, SSHCure is built upon the as-
sumption that network traffic of the brute-force phase of these
attacks exhibits a characteristic ‘flat’ behavior. This means that
multiple flows belonging to the brute-force phase of an attack
are alike in terms of the featured number of packets and bytes,
and duration [6]–[10]. The detection of the compromise phase
is then performed by detecting deviations from the flat traffic
of the brute-force phase. However, real-world deployments
of SSHCure in various networks, ranging from smaller Web
hosting companies to nation-wide backbones, have shown that
this approach fails for many attacks from especially far-away
countries. This is because network traffic of dictionary attacks
is not always as flat as one would expect, an observation
that is supported by the datasets used in [7]. Investigation
of the network traffic at the packet-level has revealed that
TCP retransmissions and other TCP control information are
the suspected causes, which are typically not identifiable at
the flow-level. Other approaches to flow-based brute-force and
compromise detection exist, such as [11], but also suffer from
TCP phenomena like retransmissions.
Only two works so far have studied behavior of TCP
retransmissions and control information on the Internet. Both
works, published in the 1990’s, focus on the behavior of
TCP variants in terms of congestion control when facing
packet loss, reordering or unexpected delays [12], [13]. The
retransmissions in these works are introduced by means of
simulating the aforementioned events, rather than measuring
their occurrence on the Internet. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no recent Internet measurements on the number of
retransmissions and other TCP control packets. This work
bridges this gap.
In this work, we study the impact of TCP retransmissions
and other control information packets on network traffic in
general and SSH intrusion detection in particular, both in a
1https://github.com/sshcure/sshcure/
Input plugin Processing &filtering plugin
Export plugin
Fig. 1. INVEA-TECH FlowMon platform architecture, as of FlowMon
Probe 6.x.
campus and a backbone network. To do so, we have extended
the set of fields exported per flow, commonly referred to as
IPFIX Information Elements (IEs), to include per-flow statis-
tics on retransmissions and control information. Measurements
have shown about 3 TiB of retransmissions per month on
typical campus and backbone network links, accounting for
roughly 1% of all TCP traffic over these links. This underlines
the hypothesis that supposedly flat traffic may become non-flat,
ergo indistinct. We study the effects of retransmissions and
control information packets on SSH dictionary attacks, and
compare the detection results of a state-of-the-art dictionary
attack detection algorithm when the added information is used
for detection instead of only traditional packet and byte coun-
ters in flow records. Our analysis shows that any flow-based
IDS may profit from per-flow statistics on retransmissions
and control information, as many previously undetected (non-
flat) attacks can be revealed, resulting in an increase of 16
percentage points in terms of true detections when using a
state-of-the-art SSH brute-force phase detection algorithm.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II,
we provide background information on TCP retransmissions
and control information, and describe how TCP can affect the
‘flatness’ of network traffic. Then, in Section III, we discuss
the defined IPFIX IEs and the implementation needed for
measuring TCP retransmissions and control information. A
description of the acquired datasets and measurement results
are provided in Section IV. In Section V, we validate this work
in the context of SSH intrusion detection, after which we draw
our conclusions and state future work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
To facilitate reliable data delivery between endpoints, TCP
uses a cumulative acknowledgement scheme in which se-
quence and acknowledgement numbers are used to signal the
reception of data. In the absence of any feedback from the data
receiver, a Retransmission TimeOut (RTO) is used to ensure
delivery, which is based on the estimated Smoothed Round-
Trip Time (SRTT). Due to unexpected delays or reordering
of packets in the network, retransmissions can occur spuri-
ously. For example, when a packet or its acknowledgement is
delayed unexpectedly rather than lost, the RTO timer expires
and the packet is retransmitted. Also, a fast retransmission
may be sent when a certain number of consecutive duplicate
acknowledgements is received, signalling the potential loss of
packets to the sender. Due to reordering of packets, duplicate
acknowledgements may be sent even though no packet has
gotten lost. These duplicate acknowledgements can trigger
a spurious fast retransmission. In both examples, spurious
retransmissions and their duplicate acknowledgements cause
additional packets and bytes in network traffic and hence affect
the potential flatness of a connection.
To optimize network throughput while avoiding congestion
or overloading an endpoint, TCP uses several techniques,
such as flow control, based on a sliding window, and the
delayed ACK mechanism. To realize flow control, the receive
window needs to be signalled from receiver to sender, and
under the delayed ACK mechanism, data acknowledgements
are held back for a brief delay to save overhead. If data or
additional control information becomes available during the
delay, the held back acknowledgement can be combined with
this information. For some forms of control information, such
as data acknowledgements and receive window changes, the
delayed ACK mechanism and circumstances dictate whether
a dedicated packet is sent to carry the control information
to the endpoint. For example, if during a delayed ACK data
is pushed down from the application-layer, the held back
acknowledgement can be piggybacked with a data packet.
This prevents sending a dedicated acknowledgement with no
payload. Also, the delayed ACK mechanism allows for the
cumulative acknowledgement of two data packets received in
rapid success. This too saves sending a dedicated packet. If the
receive window changes at the receiver, this information can
be combined with a held back acknowledgement, again saving
a dedicated packet. Sometimes, however, the receive window
expands when there is no data to acknowledge, in which case
a dedicated window update needs to be sent. Whether or not
such dedicated packets are sent affect the flatness of network
traffic.
There are also types of control information that are always
sent in separate packets: Zero Window probes and responses,
KeepAlive Probes and responses, and RST packets. Also,
depending on the TCP implementation, a three-way FIN close
sequence may not be supported, thereby potentially introduc-
ing an additional packet during the connection termination.
Any of these additional packets obviously affect the flatness
of network traffic as well.
It is important to note that the presence of the afore-
mentioned situations mostly depends on network conditions,
resource availability and scheduling on endpoints, whether or
not there is data to send or acknowledge, and timing.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
To export information that allows for the discrimination of
TCP retransmissions and control information in flow data,
several IPFIX Information Elements (IEs) were defined and
implemented as part of a flow Metering Process. This section
describes these IEs and the accompanying implementation.
We have defined IPFIX IEs for each of the TCP protocol
phenomena discussed (in italics) in Section II. To facilitate
the export of these IEs, we have developed an extension to
INVEA-TECH’s FlowMon flow exporter. This platform was
TABLE I
DATASETS
Dataset Period Duration Packets Bytes Flows
Retransmissions Control Information
Packets Bytes Packets Bytes
UT July / August 2014 31 days 370.73 G 291.64 TiB 7.35 G
5.30 G 2.83 TiB 100.50 G 4.30 TiB
(1.43%) (0.97%) (27.11%) (1.47%)
CESNET August / September 2014 31 days 257.38 G 227.67 TiB 3.57 G
8.29 G 2.78 TiB 83.61 G 3.48 TiB
(3.22%) (1.22%) (32.48%) (1.53%)
chosen because of its highly customizable plugin architecture,
and because we have full control over it in our networks.
The complete architecture is shown in Fig. 1. It is based on
plugins for data input, flow record processing & filtering, and
export. Input plugins process data from a given source, such
as one or more line cards, and are responsible for creating
flow cache entries, one entry per active flow. Process plugins
allow for the manipulation of these cache entries once these
entries have been created. The process plugin type is best
suited for program logic that does not necessarily require a
packet’s payload anymore. The export plugin is responsible for
exporting cache entries by sending flow records to a collector
using NetFlow or IPFIX. From within these plugin types,
actions can be hooked to events such as flow entries being
added to, updated in or expired from the flow cache. Among
these actions is the filtering of flow cache entries to prevent
them from being exported.
Our extension comes in the form of an input plugin, because
it evaluates the payload of packets. The plugin measures TCP
retransmissions and control information packets, and stores
and maintains related counters in the flow cache. To recognize
these particular packets, TCP conversations are analyzed in
real-time by evaluating sequence and acknowledgement num-
bers, timestamps, flags, receive window sizes, and payload
sizes. This implementation is heavily based on the TCP packet
dissector used by Wireshark.2
For the TCP analysis to be accurate, it is crucial that packets
in both directions of a TCP conversation pass through the ob-
servation point. Otherwise, the housekeeping of sequence and
acknowledgement numbers may be affected, which obviously
impairs the analysis. The same is true when packets are lost
downstream of the observation point. We are also aware of the
fact that the TCP packet dissector used by Wireshark cannot
but misclassify packets in its on-the-fly analysis in some cases,
especially when packets are reordered. To optimize our plugins
to work on high-speed links, e.g., of 10 Gbps and higher, we
accept these exceptional cases for the sake of performance.
IV. MEASURING TCP RETRANSMISSIONS
& CONTROL INFORMATION
Our first step towards understanding the impact of TCP
retransmissions and control information is to measure it in
two networks that are different in nature. Two datasets were
collected, as shown in Table I, consisting of only TCP flow
2http://www.wireshark.org/
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF RETRANSMITTED PACKETS AND BYTES
Dataset
Retransmissions Fast Retransmissions
Packets Bytes Packets Bytes
UT 95.50% 89.54% 4.50% 10.46%
CESNET 97.87% 91.27% 2.13% 8.73%
data. Dataset UT was collected on the campus network of
the University of Twente (UT). This network features a
publicly routable /16 network address block with connections
to faculty buildings, student and staff residences, etc. Due to
the residential aspect of the campus network it also routes
private c.q. non-academic Internet traffic. Furthermore, the
campus network houses mirror servers for popular open-source
software, such as Ubuntu. Dataset CESNET was collected on a
backbone link of the Czech National Research and Education
Network (NREN), specifically the link between CESNET and
the ‘commercial Internet’. Due to the academic nature of
these networks, the relative amount of traffic during summer
holidays is considerably lower than during working days.
The remainder of this section is organized in two parts.
First, in Section IV-A, we analyze retransmissions and control
information in detail based on our measurements. After that,
we perform a similar analysis only for SSH traffic in Sec-
tion IV-B, given that the validation of this work (Section V)
will be performed in the context of SSH intrusion detection.
A. Overall Traffic
Details on the number of retransmitted packets and bytes,
and the amount of control information in terms of packets and
bytes are shown in Table I. Several observations can be made.
On the one hand, TCP control information is mostly visible in
terms of packets. On the other hand, retransmissions contribute
more towards the percentage of bytes. Another observation is
that there are many more packets with control information
than there are retransmitted packets. This is mainly because
many control information packet types, such as those that
result from the delayed ACK mechanism, are sent under
all network conditions, while retransmissions appear more
frequently during network congestion, for example.
The distribution of retransmission types in terms of packets
and bytes is shown in Table II. As can be observed, most
retransmissions are regular retransmissions. Also, for each
dataset, the fraction of the total number of bytes for the
fast retransmission type is higher than the packet fraction.
TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROL INFORMATION PACKETS
Type
Dataset
UT CESNET
Duplicate ACK 5.24% 1.77%
Non-piggybacked ACK 7.61% 11.71%
Consecutive empty ACK 83.13% 80.60%
Window Update 2.02% 1.88%
Zero Window Probe (ZWP) < 0.01% 0.01%
ZWP response < 0.01% < 0.01%
RST 0.87% 2.59%
Four-way close packet 0.10% 0.21%
KeepAlive Probe 0.54% 0.74%
KeepAlive Response 0.48% 0.48%
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Fig. 2. Retransmissions over time.
We believe this is because regular retransmissions can also
contain no payload, e.g., retransmissions of empty TCP SYN
and FIN segments bring down the average number of bytes
per retransmitted packet. Considering the UT dataset, it shows
that while 4.50% of retransmitted packets are of the fast type,
these do account for 10.46% of the number of retransmitted
bytes. For the CESNET dataset, these numbers are 2.13% and
8.73%, respectively.
The number of retransmitted packets and fast retransmitted
packets within every five-minute interval in the 31 days of
the UT dataset is shown in Fig. 2. A diurnal pattern can be
clearly identified, which follows the working hours at faculty
buildings, and the presence of on-campus residents. While
Table I provides absolute numbers, and as such is not specific
about the points in time at which events occur, Fig. 2 shows
that retransmissions occur at any time of the day. The two
outlying groups of retransmitted packets around 5 Aug 18:00
and 10 Aug 18:00 coincide with severe SSH dictionary attacks
from China that involve many retransmissions, which makes
these anomalies visible in our measurements. These attacks
will be discussed later, as part of the case study in Section V.
The distribution of the various types of control information
packets is shown in Table III. As can be seen, packets related
to the delayed ACK mechanism, i.e., non-piggybacked ACKs
TABLE IV
TCP RETRANSMISSIONS & CONTROL INFORMATION – SSH
Dataset
Retransmissions Control Information
Packets Bytes Packets Bytes
UT
1488.18 M 167.36 GiB 3269.24 M 145.19 GiB
(9.53%) (1.45%) (20.93%) (1.26%)
CESNET
153.54 M 25.44 GiB 1767.31 M 76.78 GiB
(2.10%) (1.54%) (24.15%) (4.64%)
TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF RETRANSMITTED PACKETS AND BYTES – SSH
Dataset
Retransmissions Fast Retransmissions
Packets Bytes Packets Bytes
UT 99.71% 96.47% 0.29% 3.53%
CESNET 99.87% 99.07% 0.13% 0.93%
and consecutive empty ACKs, account for large percentages of
the total number of control information packets in each dataset.
For example, non-piggybacked ACKs take up 7.61% and
11.71% in UT and CESNET, respectively. Another example is
the consecutive empty ACK, with 83.13% in UT and 80.60%
in CESNET.
Given the significant presence of TCP retransmissions and
control information in our measurements in two networks
that are different in nature, we conclude that these packets
are omnipresent on the Internet. Also, we believe to have
demonstrated that the flatness of originally flat network traffic
on the Internet is likely affected by this omnipresence, as
theorized in Section II.
B. SSH Traffic
The SSH traffic considered in this work was obtained
by filtering the datasets presented in Table I for traffic on
port 22, yielding 11.29 TiB of traffic for UT and 1.62 TiB
for CESNET. Details on the number of retransmissions and
control information packets and bytes are shown in Table IV.
Several observations can be made when comparing the SSH
traffic to the overall traffic. First, for CESNET, the relative
percentage of retransmissions is lower in the SSH-only traffic
than in the overall traffic, at 2.10% versus 3.22%. For UT,
however, it is much higher, namely 9.53% versus 1.43%.
This is because the UT dataset contains several large-scale
SSH attacks, as discussed previously alongside Fig. 2. Second,
control information in the SSH datasets is more dominant than
retransmissions in terms of packets and bytes, which is similar
in the overall traffic. Third, considering that the overall traffic
in UT is only 50% larger than in CESNET in terms of bytes
(from Table I), the relative amount of SSH traffic in UT is
much larger than in CESNET.
As for retransmissions in SSH traffic, the distribution of
these in terms of packets and bytes is shown in Table V.
Compared to the distribution of retransmissions in the overall
traffic, it can be observed that a higher percentage in the
SSH traffic is of the regular retransmission type. In the
TABLE VI
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROL INFORMATION PACKETS – SSH
Type
Dataset
UT CESNET
Duplicate ACK 1.87% 2.70%
Non-piggybacked ACK 7.76% 63.63%
Consecutive empty ACK 89.58% 25.73%
Window Update 0.37% 0.35%
Zero Window probe 0.00% < 0.01%
ZWP response 0.00% < 0.01%
RST 0.31% 5.43%
Four-way close packet 0.09% 1.52%
KeepAlive probe 0.00% 0.35%
KeepAlive response 0.00% 0.31%
UT dataset, only 0.29% of retransmissions are classified as
fast retransmissions, in contrast to a figure of 4.50% in the
respective overall traffic. For CESNET, these numbers are
0.13% and 2.13%. Relative differences between the overall
traffic and the respective SSH-only traffic thus follow the same
trend. We believe that this is the case because it is less common
for SSH connections to have four or more consecutive packets
with payload sent by one endpoint within a short period. In
other words, there are not enough consecutive data packets to
trigger a fast retransmission.
The distribution of control information in SSH traffic is
shown in Table VI. This distribution features several key
differences compared to the full datasets (see Table III). A
prime example is the significantly lower number of packets
related to KeepAlive, especially for UT where there are none
at all. A possible explanation for this is that the majority of
SSH connections is short-lived, or otherwise active enough
to not trigger the TCP KeepAlive timer, which is typically
in the order of hours [14]. Another observation is that while
the distribution of control information types is very similar
within the full datasets collected on different networks, this
is not the case anymore for the SSH datasets. For example,
in the UT dataset, 0.30% of all SSH packets are RSTs, while
RSTs account for 5.43% in CESNET. We believe that this is
due to increased scanning activity. Also, for CESNET, non-
piggybacked ACKs are at a staggering 63.63%, whereas in
UT they account for only 7.76%. We believe these differences
stem from the fact that a lot more data is sent within SSH
connections on the UT network. Furthermore, for the UT and
CESNET datasets it can be seen that four-way close features
only very small percentages of control information packets,
namely 0.09% and 1.52%, respectively. This leads us to believe
that SSH network traffic is typically not affected much by this
type of control information.
V. VALIDATION
In this section, we quantify and study the effects of TCP
retransmissions and control information on flow analysis appli-
cations, in the context of a flow-based SSH intrusion detection
case study. The case study used for validation is presented
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Fig. 3. Dictionary attack phases, from [1].
in Section V-A. The validation methodology is discussed in
Section V-B. Finally, in Section V-C, we present the validation
results.
A. Case Study: SSH Intrusion Detection
The flow-based detection of dictionary attacks is typically
performed by comparing the characteristics of two or more
flow records to identify possible attacks. In [7], it is shown
that these attacks typically consist of three phases, as shown in
Fig. 3, which feature specific flow-level characteristics. During
the scan phase, an attacker probes for the presence of specific
services on one or more hosts in a network. During the brute-
force phase, a high-intensity dictionary attack is performed
on one or more targets on which the service is found active.
The brute-force phase typically contains many flow records
with an equal number of Packets-Per-Flow (PPF), since flows
featuring an equivalent number of login attempts between the
same client and server typically consist of the same number of
packets. Should a compromise ensue, the compromise phase
is reached.
In this work, we focus on the brute-force phase, since it is
the only phase where ‘flat’ traffic should be predominant. The
concept of an equal number of PPF, i.e., flat traffic, for brute-
force attacks detection forms the basis of the state-of-the-art
brute-force phase detection algorithm presented in [7], which
considers the number of PPF in consecutive flow records. The
algorithm starts with a preselection of source and destination
IP address pairs for which flow records have a PPF value of
x ∈ [11, 51]. For each of these preselected address pairs, the
most frequently used PPF value is taken as the baseline for
determining brute-force behavior. This baseline is then used
for comparing consecutive flow records with identical PPF
values to. If at least N consecutive flows feature the baseline
number of PPF, a brute-force attack is recognized. We set the
threshold N to five3, and the result of the detection algorithm
is a list of attacks. In the remainder of this work, we define
an attack as a set of one or more targets featuring brute-force
behavior for a given attacker, i.e., where every target in the
set has reached N . A tuple is defined as a pair of attacker and
target, such that every attack consists of one or more tuples.
If more than N flow records feature the same number of
PPF, a dictionary attack is detected. On the one hand, false
negatives, i.e., undetected attacks, can occur in this context
when dictionary attack flows end up with diverse PPF values,
causing the threshold N to not be reached, even though
3Note that five consecutive flow records with the same number of PPF
would represent 15 failed login attempts in a benign situation, as explained
in [7], which we consider highly unlikely.
the application-layer activity remains similar. On the other
hand, false positives, i.e., false alarms, can occur when non-
dictionary attack flows end up with equal PPF values, enough
to reach the threshold N .
B. Methodology
We perform the validation of this work by executing the
state-of-the-art detection algorithm presented in [7] on the
datasets listed in Section I. Instead of only considering the
regular number of PPF in the detection algorithm, as would
be the case in a regular flow monitoring setup, we also
consider a compensated number of PPF. The compensated
number of PPF consists of the number of the total number of
packets metered for each flow minus the number of packets
of all retransmissions and TCP control information fields.
Ultimately, this should result in flat traffic when it comes to
attacks.
By comparing the detection results when using non-
compensated and compensated data, we can quantitatively
evaluate the gain of ‘flattening’ traffic in the context of
SSH intrusion detection. We perform the comparison in two
dimensions – attacks and tuples – as this allows us to discover
potential differences in the impact of compensation. Although
comparing the number of detections in terms of attacks and
tuples before and after compensation provides an indication
of the detection improvements, it does not reveal anything
about to accuracy of these detection outcomes. To assess these
accuracies, we have performed a large-scale validation by
collecting authentication logs of 58 machines on the campus
network of the UT – 56 servers and 2 honeypots – to serve
as the ground-truth for validation. These authentication logs
are the only means of validating whether a machine has really
been under attack. Since we only have the logs for UT hosts,
we only consider the UT dataset in this part of the validation.
In the authentication logs, a minimum number of failed
attempts must be encountered for the behavior to be considered
a dictionary attack. Since the detection algorithm considers at
least N consecutive flow records, only N or more connections
to the SSH server that contain at least one failed attempt are
considered. This comes down to at least five sessions with one
or more authentication failures each. By evaluating log entries
featuring this property, we created a list of attacks to serve
as ground-truth for validation. This ground-truth can then be
used for expressing the accuracy of the algorithm, both in
terms of attacks and tuples, by comparing detection results to
the ground-truth based on the following metrics:
• True Positives (TP) – Attacks/tuples correctly classified to
feature a brute-force phase, for which 5 or more sessions
with authentication failures are reported in the ground-
truth.
• False Positive (FP) – Attacks/tuples incorrectly classi-
fied to feature a brute-force phase, for which less than
5 sessions with authentication failures are reported in the
ground-truth.
• True Negatives (TN) – Attacks/tuples correctly classified
to not feature a brute-force phase, for which less than
5 sessions with authentication failures are reported in the
ground-truth.
• False Negatives (FN) – Attacks/tuples incorrectly classi-
fied to not feature a brute-force phase, for which 5 or
more sessions with authentication failures are reported in
the ground-truth.
Using these metrics, we can evaluate the differences in the
detection algorithm for the non-compensated and compensated
cases in terms of accuracy (Acc), which is defined as follows:
Acc =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(1)
In addition, to understand the relation between TCP control
information and retransmissions, and geographical locations,
we determine the physical origin of attacks and tuples based
on a snapshot of the MaxMind GeoIP4 database at the time
of the measurements. The physical location can reveal why
certain attacks or the majority of tuples are more likely
to be detected only after compensation, as we hypothesize
that retransmissions are strongly bound to the geographical
distance between attackers and targets.
C. Results
The best way to visualize the achievements of this work
is by means of a plot, as shown in Fig. 4. This figure
shows the traffic in terms of the number of PPF over time
between a single tuple of attacker and target. Clearly, the
original network traffic (i.e., the sum of the three series in
the figure) is not flat, but after compensating for control
information packets and retransmissions, traffic that is almost
flat remains. Occasional variations in the remaining number
of PPF after compensation are the result of the performance
trade-off discussed in Section III. We accept these variations,
considering that most attacks feature a large enough number
of flows to reach the threshold N .
The results of operating the detection algorithm on the
considered datasets, both with and without PPF compensation,
are shown in Table VII for attacks and Table IX for tuples.
The number of detected attacks and tuples is considerably
higher after compensation for both datasets. In CESNET,
the total number of detected attacks is about a fourth times
higher after compensation, i.e., from 9475 to 11849, while
the improvement in terms of tuples is at 40%. For the UT
dataset, a gain of 35% in terms of attacks can be observed
– from 3499 to 4707 – and a gain of 45% in terms of
tuples. The reason for the improvement in terms of attacks
is that without compensation, the effects of retransmissions
and control information hinder the detection for all tuples of
an attack and, as such, the corresponding attack itself is also
not detected.
Since we assume that retransmissions depend in part on
the geographical location of and route between attacker and
target, we show for each dataset the five countries from which
4We have used MaxMind’s GeoLite City database, which can be retrieved
from http://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/legacy/geolite/.
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Fig. 4. Compensated brute-force flow records.
TABLE VII
TOP FIVE ATTACK ORIGINS – ATTACKS
Dataset Country Non-compensated Compensated
UT
China 1817 2347 (+29%)
Netherlands 317 694 (+119%)
Venezuela 195 233 (+19%)
Russian Federation 165 189 (+15%)
Chile 154 164 (+6%)
Other 851 1080 (+27%)
Total 3499 4707 (+35%)
CESNET
China 15239 19683 (+29%)
United States 316 (+14%)
Brazil 239 257 (+8%)
Korea 146 170 (+17%)
Turkey 124 139 (+12%)
Other 1075 1420 (+32%)
Total 17139 21985 (+28%)
TABLE VIII
DETECTION PERFORMANCE – ATTACKS
Dataset Loggedattacks TPR FPR TNR FNR Acc
UT
812
0.644 0.087 0.913 0.356 0.788
compensated 0.784 0.096 0.904 0.216 0.849
most attacks originate, both in terms of attacks (Table VII)
and tuples (Table IX). The total number of countries involved
in attacks is 60 for the UT dataset, and 71 for CESNET.
Furthermore, we show the number of attacks and tuples
reported only after compensation for those countries. Several
observations can be made from the results. First, regarding
the UT dataset, many attacks that are detected only after
compensation have the attacking host located in China, with
a figure of 530 attacks and 23331 tuples. While China easily
outperforms the other countries in terms of attacks and tuples
in UT, the relative increase of the number of attacks and
tuples not reported until after compensation from China is also
relatively high. More specifically, the increase in the number
of attacks from China is 29%, and for tuples the increase
is a staggering 73%. China also dominates in the CESNET
dataset, where 4444 attacks from China are detected only after
TABLE IX
TOP FIVE ATTACK ORIGINS – TUPLES
Dataset Country Non-compensated Compensated
UT
China 31887 55218 (+73%)
Netherlands 11048 11646 (+5%)
United States 3573 4203 (+18%)
Vietnam 2358 2396 (+2%)
Germany 1592 1642 (+3%)
Other 10197 12939 (+27%)
Total 60655 88044 (+45%)
CESNET
China 799840 1109458 (+39%)
United States 37161 41230 (+11%)
France 16096 22818 (+42%)
Korea 10051 10890 (+8%)
Malaysia 5579 5811 (+4%)
Other 36994 48521 (+31%)
Total 905721 1234659 (+36%)
TABLE X
DETECTION PERFORMANCE – TUPLES
Dataset Loggedtuples TPR FPR TNR FNR Acc
UT
4562
0.430 0.081 0.919 0.570 0.689
compensated 0.585 0.090 0.910 0.415 0.758
compensation, and 309618 tuples. The respective gains are
29% and 39%. Second, for the UT dataset, we implicitly know
the geographical location of the targets of attacks. Moreover,
we know that traffic between hosts located in China and the UT
campus network is often susceptible to packet loss. The same
can be said for the United States, for which an 18% gain in
terms of tuples can be observed. All these observations make
us conclude that TCP control information and retransmissions
are indeed strongly bound to the distance in geographical
location between attacker and target, and that the effects on
detection can be observed quantitatively.
Out of the top five attack origins in UT, the gain in
the number of detected attacks from The Netherlands after
compensation is at 119%. This gain is higher than the 29%
for China, for example, while attackers in The Netherlands are
located closer (from a geographical point-of-view) to UT’s
campus network. Investigation of the measurement data has
shown that for attacks where the route between attacker and
target is not impaired by apparent packet loss or high(er)
latencies, the non-flatness of network traffic is caused mostly
by packets that relate to TCP’s delayed ACK mechanism and
not by retransmissions, which is more likely for far-away
countries.
Thus far we have shown the different detection results when
using compensated and non-compensated data. However, we
have yet to compare these detection results to our ground-
truth, consisting of authentication logs from 58 machines on
the campus network of the UT. Since the ground-truth covers
only a subset of the machines considered before, the number
of attacks and tuples reported in the remainder of this section
is lower than reported in Table VII and Table IX.
The detection performance of the detection algorithm in
terms of attacks is shown in Table VIII, where we again
divide the results in both compensated and non-compensated.
Analogously, the detection performance in terms of tuples in
shown in Table X. In both tables, we use the percentages
of the previously introduced evaluation metrics. For example,
the True Positive Rate (TPR) is the percentage of correctly
identified attacks/tuples for which 5 or more sessions with
authentication failures are reported in the ground-truth. The
overall conclusion of the results is that compensation of the
number of PPF yields a significantly improved TPR for both
attacks and tuples. The TPR for attacks has improved from
64% to 78% for the UT dataset. For tuples, the figures are from
43% to 59%. These major improvements come at a minor cost
in terms of false detections of roughly 1%. Also the accuracies
for both attacks and tuples have improved significantly, from
79% to 85%, and 69% to 76%, respectively. We believe
that the slight increase in the number of false detections is
the case because of misclassified packets (e.g., unrecognized
retransmissions), which in some cases cause benign network
traffic to mimic dictionary attacks by becoming flat. These
false positives are thus coupled to the performance trade-offs
made in the plugin, as explained in Section III.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have measured the impact of TCP control
information and retransmissions on networks in general, and
on flow-based intrusion detection in particular. We set out
by hypothesizing that the presence of these TCP phenomena
in network traffic can impair analysis applications. Our mea-
surements have confirmed that these phenomena are indeed
omnipresent in any network. In our measurements, retrans-
missions account for 1–4% of all TCP packets, while control
information accounts for significantly more, namely 27–33%.
When it comes to bytes, each phenomenon contributes roughly
1–3% of all TCP traffic.
In the context of intrusion detection, we analyzed the
impact of compensating for the considered TCP phenomena
in a state-of-the-art dictionary attack detection algorithm for
SSH. The results unmistakably demonstrate that flow-based
intrusion detection benefits from a compensated number of
PPF; the TPRs of the considered detection algorithm have
improved for attacks and tuples from 64% to 78%, and
from 43% to 59%, respectively. Moreover, the detection ac-
curacies increase from 79% to 85%, and 69% to 76%. This
was achieved without any change to the algorithm, i.e., in
a manner transparent to the analysis application. This leads
us to conclude that many of the possible flow monitoring
applications mentioned in [4] can benefit from this work. From
talks with a vendor of flow export devices we have even
learned that adding a selection of the statistics used in this
work to flow data is of interest to many customers, and that
efforts are being undertaken to do so in one of their products.
As future work we consider analyzing variability at the
application level by looking at protocols such as SSH. Vari-
ability in application-layer protocols may be introduced both
intentionally and unintentionally, and can result from variable
length application content or from random padding if the
protocol in question allows it. Especially in case of intentional
variation, hardly two flows in an attack may appear similar.
Detecting the described forms of variability may aid in ob-
taining even flatter traffic patterns.
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